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all levels of the IoT stack. Despite the universal agreement on the need of a
standardized technology stack (following the model of the world-wide-web),
there is a proliferation of industry-driven domain specific standards that are
hindering the development of a single IoT ecosystem. An attempt to solve
this situation is the introduction of O-MI (Open Messaging Interface) and
O-DF (Open Data Format), two domain independent standards published by
the Open Group. The standards do not define any specific security model,
and this thesis work tries to define suitable access control and authentication
mechanisms that can regulate the rights of different principals and opera-
tions defined in these standards. First, an introduction of the O-MI and
O-DF standards, including a comparison with existing standards is provided.
Then, envisioned security model is presented, together with the implementa-
tion details of the plug-in module developed for the O-MI and O-DF reference
implementation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter is an introduction to the thesis. It starts with the reasoning
part (motivation), then provides some background information about the field
of research. After that the main research questions are asked and research
framework is introduced. At last, the structure of this thesis is presented.
1.1 Motivation
The Internet was originally developed for the military [1] and security has
been a concern since very first appearance. The first network, ARPANET [2]
was established in 1969 with the only two members, but it grew rapidly to 213
by 1981 [3, 4], mainly adding the main universities across the United States.
The rapid diffusion of the personal computer, together with the widespread
adoption of standards such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Inter-
net Protocol), HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) and HTML (Hypertext
Markup Language), lead to the creation of a worldwide, standardized network
commonly known as the WWW (World Wide Web).
During the last 20 years the Internet has grown exponentially reaching over
one-third of the world population [5, 6] and has become an essential part of
our daily life. The web has become the primary mean to access to information,
news, instant communication, shopping and entertainment. It has transformed
our everyday life activities so radically that it has been defined by some as
the “8th continent” [7, 8]. However, the more we rely on the web to store
our data and support our daily activities, the more we become vulnerable to
potential security attacks. For example, online shopping provide the amazing
1
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opportunity to purchase anything from anywhere in the world, but banks and
online payment systems are constantly fighting a cyber war with hackers try-
ing to compromise their systems [9, 10]. These attacks are not limited to large
service providers, but they also affect ordinary users. Phishing is a big threat
for naive or inexperienced Internet. Although the attention and education on
cyber-security is rising, new challenges are on the horizon. An increasing num-
ber of physical devices, ranging from light bulbs, home appliances, heartbeat
monitors to more sensitive ones such as fire alarms, ventilation and heating
systems, locks [11, 12, 13] are getting connected to the Internet. In the past,
the worst consequence of a cyber-attack could be evaluated in term of mone-
tary losses; while the potential hack of some of these devices can translate into
real physical danger affecting human lives.
The Internet of things is quickly becoming reality, and security should be
the number one priority of any new connected product or installation. However
this is seldom the case. The fear of losing business opportunities creates great
pressure to bring the so-called Minimum Viable Product (MVP) as fast as pos-
sible to market. Obviously in these conditions, security is rarely paramount
and securing IoT devices can be quite complicated and expensive. It is reason-
able to think that ransomware (a type of malware that restricts access to the
infected system in some way, and demands that the user pay a ransom to the
malware operators to remove the restriction) will soon move from computers
to IoT devices.
1.2 Research Objective and Framework
The motivations described above highlight how IoT security is a very rele-
vant, very vast and complex topic. The complexity in part comes from the fact
that the IoT protocol landscape is still pretty fragmented. Partly reusing and
extending the OSI model (Open Systems Interconnection model), figure 1.1
tries to depict the current IoT standards and protocols landscape. It is quite
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Figure 1.1: IoT standards/protocols landscape. Adapted from [14]
evident how the current status is much more dynamic and messy compared to
the web (or “traditional Internet”).
Many protocols has been designed and used for specific use cases. This
allows having fast and successful one-shoot applications but in turns is un-
dermining the development of a true unified IoT technology stack. A clear
solution to the proliferation of vertical solutions and custom APIs is obviously
standardization. The vision for a seamless IoT requires protocols to be domain
independent yet capable to adapt to different standards and environment. An
attempt to solve this issues (at least at the application level) comes from the
recently published (under The Open Group) standards Open Messaging Inter-
face (O-MI) and Open Data Format (O-DF), whose potential impact for the
IoT is similar to the impact of HTTP and HTML for the World Wide Web
when they were published.
However, these standards do not define (on purpose) any specific security
model. They clearly state how suitable security mechanism can be applied “on-
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top” of these standards. This thesis focuses on the development of a security
model for these promising IoT standards, and tries to give an answer to the
following research questions:
• How a common messaging standard can help to solve the problem of the
communication between the different devices in the Internet of Things?
• What are O-MI and O-DF standards and how well they satisfy the re-
quirements of the Internet of Things? How they are different in compar-
ison with already existing standards and solutions?
• How can these standards be implemented and integrated into arbitrary
application together with the access control and security mechanisms?
The questions above rose because of the need to have a generalized standard
that could satisfy the requirements of the Internet of Things. Furthermore, the
reference implementation of the O-MI and O-DF standards has to be presented
and analyzed. Thus, there are several main guidelines that lead this work:
• Background topic discussion. Mainly based on the review of vari-
ous literature in Internet of Things topic. The review was performed to
provide a brief introduction to the industry, its main needs and possible
problems. This study goes along with the description of the messaging
protocols for the Internet of Things and the process of understanding the
requirements for the implementation.
• Reference implementation overview. The reference implementation
of the O-MI and O-DF standards is studied together with the examples of
the possible use cases. That part includes also a discussion about existing
security mechanisms and the need of implementing the access control and
authentication system for the reference implementation.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
• Security module design and implementation. The main part of
the thesis that describes the whole process from the formulation of the
security requirements to the design and implementation of the security
module.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters: The chapter following this introduction
provides a literature review of the IoT domain, discussing needs and issues of
the current state of art. It later dives deeper into existing network protocols
that are suitable IoT messaging protocols. In Chapter 3 the description of the
core concepts and design principles of O-MI and O-DF standards are provided,
justifying its selection as primary application level messaging protocols for the
IoT. Chapter 4 describes the current O-MI and O-DF reference implementation
and demonstrates how these standards can be used in a particular application.
Chapter 5 provides the requirements for the security and access control modules
that has been developed during this thesis, followed by the core implementation
decisions. Finally, chapter 6 provides summary, conclusions and future research
directions of the work performed.
Chapter 2
Internet of Things
2.1 Introduction
Connecting physical devices to Internet allows retrieving data and remote
interaction with physical spaces. Combining these types of information, with
existing one, such as weather forecast provided by external web services or
OpenData dataset, open up new opportunities to create new type of products
and services that are far beyond the capability of any given “isolated” system
[15].
IoT is an emerging trend that is expanding very rapidly, and it has the
potential of impacting our life as much as the Internet itself. In comparison
with fixed Internet wave in 1990s that has connected about 1 billion users and
mobile Internet wave in 2000s that has connected 2 billion users, the IoT has
a potential to connect 28 billion “things” to the Internet by 2020 [16]. Com-
munication not only between human beings, but human-to-machine and even
machine-no-machine is possible, which lead to the next generation of intelli-
gent and highly distributed systems. These systems could help us to increase
our living standards significantly [17]. Humanity is going to connect almost
everything together. Smart watches and glasses, action cameras, cars, even
people’s homes (lights, relays, temperature and humidity sensors etc.). Smart
cities with intelligent traffic lights, parking spaces interconnected into wireless
sensor networks will become the normality in the near future [16, 18]. Be-
sides that, IoT is planned to use in Industrial Internet to connect the machines
that perform manufacturing processes, get real-time analytics and perform op-
timizations [19].
6
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One of the main drivers of this rapid evolution is the significant decline
in cost of hardware (sensors and processing power) and network connectivity.
The cost of bandwidth has been declining year by year and for the last 10 years
it has dropped dramatically by a factor of nearly 40x. The processing power
did the same but by a factor of 60x [16]. These processes have quite positive
consequences for the development of IoT.
Large enterprises, which have already impacted our daily life (e.g. Google,
Apple, Samsung etc.) play a major role in the development of the entire IoT
ecosystem. They have all the necessary resources (money, technologies and
professional staff) to influence current and future development. Moreover, they
could decide to introduce radically new products and technologies while pro-
viding integration and support in their existing ones (e.g. iOS or Android
ecosystem).
On the other hand, research institutes and SMEs working in specific nar-
row domains are often the ones that bring true innovations, leveraging on the
possibility of taking bigger risks, leaner management and bureaucracy. The
business model of some these companies often culminates in the acquisition
of their technologies by some of the major players mentioned above. Sadly
the evolution of those technologies often dies out due to the lack of vision on
how they can embed them into their current product portfolio. Every large
player is essentially trying to establish “a winning platform”, which in many
cases is supposed to be open but often contains some proprietary technologies
which give control power to the vendor. It is very true in the mobile market,
in which is possible to distinguish different devices with different approaches
and technologies used. These technologies are often closed to the public and
incompatible with each other [20], further hindering interoperability.
However it is possible to witness a very different situation if we consider the
World Wide Web, which is a brilliant example of what can be achieved with the
wide adoption of a set open standards and technologies [21]. It is imperative to
apply the same logic for the IoT, otherwise there is the concrete risk of creating
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industry verticals in which few vendors have the business interest in keeping
the ecosystem fragmented to defend their dominant position.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of vertical and horizontal interaction between systems
Fortunately, more than one standardization body is working to prevent this
danger. One of these organization is The Open Group, which has published
two standards (Open Messaging Interface and Open Data Format) to address
the challenges mentioned above. Chapter 3 will provide in depth explanation
of these standards and the current reference implementation that provides a
“sandbox” infrastructure to showcase and promote the standards.
Before introducing these standards details, this chapter will addressed some
of the existing protocols and messaging standards that are commonly used in
IoT and describe the set of requirement that a trigger the creation of O-MI and
O-DF.
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2.2 Issues and concerns
Giving the fact that the IoT will potentially connect billions of devices,
there is an understandable concern regarding network capacity and suitable
communication patterns and protocols: [22] describes how it would be possible
to give every device a unique address using IPv6 that is being integrated al-
ready, [23] highlights how the current state-of-the-art requires application-layer
gateways both in software and hardware that provide application-specific con-
nectivity to IoT devices. In much the same way that it would be difficult to
imagine requiring a new web browser for each website, it is hard to imagine our
current approach to IoT connectivity scaling to support the IoT vision. Similar
concern are expressed in [24], which states that “The future is not going to be
just people talking to people or people accessing information. It’s going to be
about using machines to talk to other machines on behalf of people with totally
new communication pattern arising between people to machines and machines
to machines.
The current situation is an everyday problem for IoT practitioners, deal-
ing with hundreds of different manufacturers with thousands types of different
sensors, software, protocols, message structures etc. Without a clear standard-
ization between different organizations and countries the expansion of truly
worldwide Internet of Things can become difficult to achieve. It is quite obvi-
ous that IoT community must follow the example of the World Wide Web, in
which TCP/IP, HTTP/HTML helped the Internet to spread across the world
[25]. Now the real question to answer is how it can be achieved. Finding con-
vergence at every level of protocols stack will still take few years and perhaps
(at least for some of the lower level) we accept the fact that different protocols
serving particular requirements will co-exist. What is already pretty clear is
that every level of stack must implements some sort of security mechanism that
would fit with the upper and lower levels. This thesis focuses on this aspect
and in particular with the application level security.
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2.2.1 Why IoT security is so important?
Security is often the hottest point of the discussion between IoT develop-
ers and practitioners; this is due to realization that the level of connectivity
and involvement of IoT in people’s everyday life is much deeper. The infor-
mation that people share with their devices and sensors is often sensitive and
is supposed to provide a background and context-awareness for the new types
of services. Therefore it should be guaranteed that this information would not
go anywhere else [26, 27]. If everything is connected to the one huge network
then every single client of the network could automatically become the starting
point of an attack to the whole network and that is the thing that will most
likely happen. Especially when talking about publicly available objects such
as bus stops and so on. Despite cyber security these objects can be hacked
physically and since they do not belong to any particular person it can be hard
to protect them. Moreover, there are already many different scenarios that
were demonstrated on public - getting the control of a car remotely or stopping
its engine when you are riding on a highway [28], hacking a babysitter radio
[29] and so on. People’s houses, smart watches with the information about the
health, traffic lights or public ventilation and life supporting systems can be
potentially hacked. These things may scare the society away from the using of
the IoT and stop the whole industry from the development. Thus, the security
aspects should be carefully designed and worked out. The privacy, authenti-
cation, access control mechanisms, the way the sensitive data is stored should
satisfy the security requirements and stand the possible attacks in the worst
cases.
To sum up, there are several challenges related with the Internet of Things.
Some of them are relatively easy to solve by applying existing technologies,
but the security problem requires thorough elaboration in a close collaboration
with the manufacturers, standardization groups, software developers and the
users.
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2.3 Messaging protocols
The number of internet-connected Humans and “Things” is on the rise and
new types of communication are arising: the usual human-to-device, but also
device-to-device, device-to-server, server-to-server communications are going to
become widely used [30]. The traditional request-reply communication is only
one of the many that are necessary to satisfy the needs of future users and
services. A wide range of messaging patterns are already implemented by a
number of messaging protocols, this section will describe the communication
protocols that have been typically used in IoT applications.
2.3.1 MQTT
MQTT stands for Message Queue Telemetry Transport. It was originally
designed by IBM and with the purpose of use in unreliable networks with high
latency and low bandwidth [31]. Its main purpose was to collect the data from
various devices in the network in one centralized place and make it available
for the IT infrastructure [30, 31, 32]. So in IoT terms it can be many devices
connected to the cloud server and providing the data (figure 2.2). That can be
useful for example to support the pipelines infrastructure and monitor it for
acts of leaks or vandalism using thousands of sensors. It runs on the top of
TCP providing the reliable stream to deliver the messages from the devices to
the data concentrators [30]. The devices can subscribe to certain data updates
as well as publish its own data on a real-time basis.
Although MQTT is a quite lightweight, it requires the TCP/IP support
that can cause unnecessary complexity and can be difficult to provide using
very small and computationally ineffective devices to build sensor networks
for example [33]. The publish-subscribe model requires an intermediate actor,
the message broker that processes and forwards all the messages. The message
broker can become a bottleneck and a single point of failure of the system. Also
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Figure 2.2: MQTT communication model. Source: ibm.com
in the IoT it’s not given for granted that the devices always have an Internet
or network connection. Thus the direct interaction from machine to machine
including publish-subscribe feature would be preferred. The broker can persist
the messages, but protocol does not support the persisted messages to backup
inside the server [34]. In security terms brokers can require credentials from
the clients as well as the connection can be secured with SSL/TLS [34, 35].
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2.3.2 CoAP
CoAP or Constrained Application Protocol was intended to use in small
electronic devices such as sensors, switches and so on. It was designed with the
purpose of easy integration with HTTP, has support for multicast packages,
low overhead and quite simple structure [36, 37]. Its main purpose was to pro-
vide efficient machine-to-machine communication in restricted environments
with a small amount of ROM and RAM memory available. It runs over UDP
with QoS support to enable decent level of reliability. The interaction model is
server/client where the client sends request and gets response from the server
[36]. The subscription feature is supported to some extent - client can observe
certain information by setting a special flag in GET request and it will start
receiving the notifications afterwards. The notifications are delivered at “best-
effort”. The protocol itself since it works over UDP is designed as eventually
consistent: If the device is not undergo to a new change in state, all subscribers
will eventually receive its final status at some time [38]. Even though the QoS
provides some sort of reliability for messages to be “confirmed” (by sending
an acknowledgment packet from the receiving party) and “non-confirmed”, it
could cause some traffic overflow in case of resending of the data and waiting
for an acknowledgment because UDP has no delivery control mechanism em-
bedded. CoAP supports service discovery using multicast packets (which can
be a problem for some networks though) and URI for objects and data [36].
Since it runs over UDP the TLS/SSL can’t be supported, but the protocol is
still secured by DTLS [38] (although DTLS does not work for group communi-
cation using multicast messages and can also add some complexity because of
additional control over UDP related to dealing with unreliable environments).
It worth mentioning that in an official specification of CoAP there is a chapter
about security consideration saying that due to the lack of handshake mecha-
nism in UDP the IP spoofing attacks are possible to a single endpoint, group
of endpoints or event the whole network for example by spoofing acknowledge,
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multicast or observe messages [36].
Figure 2.3: XMPP communication model. Source: electronicdesign.com
2.3.3 XMPP
XMPP stands for Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol, was origi-
nally called “Jabber”. It was developed to connect people to other people via
instant messaging (figure 2.3). It runs on top of HTTP that is on top of TCP.
It’s not intended to be fast, most implementations even support the polling or
update on demand. Thus it provides a reliable, but slow service [39, 40]. Its
main strength is in addressing since it uses human-readable user@domain.com
names. On the other hand there are several extensions for the protocol that
make it fast and applicable for different areas such as VoIP and online gam-
ing. It uses XML as the data format, but it rather uses XML stream than
documents basis. It has a decentralized architecture where a client and server
interact using the request/response principle, transferring the state (it’s called
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stanzas) through XML. The server has an ability to manage long-lived TCP
connection to exchange XML states several times using the same connection.
The connection can be also secured using SSL/TLS mechanism [40]. The only
format supported is XML, which may introduce significant overhead that can
be crucial when using on small embedded devices.
2.3.4 AMQP
AMQP stands for Advanced Message Queuing Protocol. It provides services
for the middleware that is a message-oriented. It takes care of the queuing,
routing, orientation, reliability and security of the messages (figure 2.4). The
protocol supports publish-subscribe paradigm as well [41]. It was developed
mainly because of a need from a banking industry and similar ones where there
was a lack of reliable and secure protocols that can deliver thousands of highly
important transactions. The communication between the endpoints, publishers
and subscribers runs over TCP and provides a strictly reliable stream. The
QoS provides at-most-once, at-least-once and exactly-once delivery options [42].
Authentication is supported by SASL or TLS technologies under the hood [43].
The data format is defined by a self-describing encoding scheme that has an
exact description in a standard document.
The data can include also the application specific information that can be
encoded in any way and contain it’s own structure [44]. Despite all the ad-
vantages, the protocol is quite heavy and is mainly used for server-to-server
interaction to exchange the data for example for an analysis or the other pur-
pose even if the target servers are deployed with a completely different hardware
and software platforms. Thus its main advantage is interoperability, but the
heaviness of the protocol makes its usage on the end devices hard.
To sum up, there are several protocols that can potentially fit a niche in the
specific application of the IoT. But each of them has its disadvantages such as
a dead lock to the one specific data format, lack of the “back up” feature or
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Figure 2.4: AMQP communication model. Source: amqp.org
the mechanism to retrieve the data for a specific period of time. Some of the
protocols are suitable for server-to-server or machine-to-machine messaging but
then there is a need to invent some intermediate protocols to interact between
different levels and that can lead to undesirable increase in the complexity level
of the system. To better understand the differences between the protocols and
make conclusions they will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next section.
2.4 Suitable messaging protocol for the IoT
In this section the protocols that were described above will be analyzed
using comparison framework introduced in [45]. First the framework is briefly
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described and its main comparison points are outlined, then the comparison
between the protocols is performed and some conclusions presented.
2.4.1 Comparison framework
The comparison framework consists of several criteria that are semantically
divided into three categories. These categories among with the criteria are
introduced below.
Message delivery model. This category defines the criteria that are
related to the delivery of the message from the sender to the receiver. This
category is the biggest one and makes the basis of the framework. It consists
of the following criteria:
1. Messaging API : defines whether the messaging interface protocol is application-
specific or independent;
2. Initiation: defines the way how the transmission of the data is being
initiated. It can be either server-initiated (i.e. push mechanism) or client-
initiated (i.e. pull mechanism). In the first case the client always listens
for the notification and the data from the server. In the second case the
client requests new data when it needed (“pulls” it).
3. Intermediation: specifies whether the protocol relies on the intermediate
parties to complete the operations (or at least offers that possibility).
4. Persistence: specifies whether the protocol offers the data persistence
feature. That can be split into two modes - persistent and transient.
Persistent, means that the data is stored in the system and can be re-
trieved at any time. Transient - the data will be stored and valid as long
as the Time-To-Live (TTL) parameter specifies etc.
5. Subscription: specifies whether the protocol supports the subscription
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mechanism. In this case two kinds of subscriptions are defined - Interval-
based and event-based.
6. Self-contained: means whether the message contains all the necessary
information to be understandable for the receiver in the right context,
meaning if it contains for example a time-to-live parameter, an operation
to be performed and so on.
7. Protocol agnostic: specifies whether the protocol supports several under-
lying “low-level” transportation protocols that can be changed without
rewriting the core of the protocol itself. It means the possibility to use
the protocols such as HTTP, SOAP, SMTP and so on to transfer the
data, or even physical transfer using copy to USB sticks.
8. Synchronicity: simply defines the support of synchronous and asynchronous
operations in the protocol.
9. Delivery-guarantee: specifies whether the protocol provides a support
for guaranteed message delivery (by sending acknowledge responses for
example).
10. Piggy backing: specifies the policy to allow piggy backing a new request
with the response (i.e. without dissociation of the new request from the
response). That property can be very important in real-time applications
or applications that are located behind a firewall.
11. Multiple payloads: defines whether the protocol supports various formats
of the payload data.
Message processing model. This category describes the processing of
the received messages by the receiver, how the communication process is defined
for the processing the data and sending the response back to the requester.
There are two criteria for that:
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13. Processing result: defines a way, which the processed data is returned to
the requester. There are three different options. First single return value -
for every request the receiver generates only one single response. Another
option is single integrated return value, which means the response that
contains the requested value integrated with the data. The last option
is a set of individual return values - when response is sent at different
intervals.
14. Communication: specifies the way that two nodes use to communicate
with each other after the message was received from the requester. There
are two possible options: separate message or callback address. The first
one means sending the response as a separate message to the query, the
second one means sending the data as a separate request to the specified
callback address that listens for the data.
Message failure model. This is the last category; it defines the actions
or the rules that the protocol follows in case of delivery failures or other dis-
ruptions. There is only one criterion:
15. Failure notification: specifies a way that protocol uses to react to the
failures i.e. the way the protocol use to send the failure notifications.
There are three possible ways that are usually used and implemented:
Timeout of acknowledgement, Reply with error message or Exception.
2.4.2 Comparison between existing protocols
The four existing protocols that are introduced and briefly described are
compared with each other and with O-MI / O-DF standard using the compar-
ison framework from [45] that was introduced earlier. The results are in Table
2.1.
It’s highlighted that AMQP and O-MI / O-DF standards cover the most
of the properties and subproperties and often provide the possibility to choose
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Table 2.1: Messaging protocol comparison based on 14 criteria
Property Sub-property M
Q
T
T
C
oA
P
X
M
P
P
A
M
Q
P
O
-M
I
Messaging API Application-specific 3 3
Application-independent 3 3 3
Initiation Push 3 3 3 3 3
Pull 3 3 3 3
Intermediation 3 3 3 3 3
Persistence Transient 3 3 3 3
Persistent 3 3 3 3
Subscription Interval-based 3
Event-based 3 3 3 3 3
Self-contained 3 3
Protocol agnostic 3
Synchronicity Synchronous 3 3 3 3
Asynchronous 3 3 3 3 3
Delivery-guarantee 3 3 3 3
Piggy backing 3 3
Multiple payloads 3 3 3 3 3
Processing Result
Single return value 3 3 3 3 3
Single integrated return value 3 3
Set of individual return value 3 3 3 3
Communication Separate message 3 3 3 3 3
Callback address 3
Failure Notification
Timeout of Acknowledgment 3 3 3 3
Reply with error message 3 3 3 3 3
Exception 3
between several variants.
The O-MI and O-DF standards are the only ones who provide the possibility
to make interval-based subscriptions, which can be important in some real-time
applications. All the protocols support usage of intermediate parties and nodes
to complete the transactions, but only O-MI / O-DF offers it as an optional
(not-necessary) feature. Self-contained message types are important as well
because in different systems same field names can have dramatically different
actions or meanings and it’s crucial for every system to be able to understand
from the message what is the semantic of the information that is provided.
AMQP and O-MI / O-DF offer that by using special namespaces and links to
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the field descriptions that can be loaded by the processing software. O-MI is
the only standard that provides full protocol agnostic communication and thus
can be easily integrated to use different underlying transport protocols. CoAP
has somewhat similar in the meaning of easy integration with RESTful HTTP
services, but it still uses unreliable UDP as the transmission protocol.
Piggy backing property is also a very important one. In the modern condi-
tions it can be difficult for companies to provide every device with a fixed IP
address (e.g. for mobile dynamic environments). In addition to that, companies
are tend to secure their data and often establish their workflow using internal
local networks that are located behind firewalls. Together with other proactive
measures it is used to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of the
data. It leads to challenging conflicts between availability or usability and data
security. Here the piggy backing technology plays a big role. It overcomes that
problem and still allows establishing bidirectional information exchange with
the devices without fixed IP address that are located behind the firewall. For
real-time systems related to control and maintenance activities that is a quite
important feature. The table above shows that this functionality is covered by
CoAP and O-MI / O-DF only.
Starting from different standards of different systems that need to interact
with each other it worth to mention the necessity to support different payload
formats. Together with the self-contained property of the messages it makes
possible for different systems to understand how to deal with the data that was
received in the payload. It becomes vital when the complexity of the systems
grows as well as the number of actors interacting with each other. In this
regard, all the protocols considered supporting this feature.
The callback feature can be useful when doing with the subscriptions and
allows specifying a particular URL where the data or the events will be sent.
Again when dealing with the actors located behind the firewalls it can help to
specify the main processing point that has a fixed IP address and processes the
data that is related to several different actors. O-MI / O-DF standards are the
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only ones who provides the feature.
It’s also worth to mention that CoAP and MQTT protocols were designed
mainly to work in local environments so they need to be modified to be able
to communicate on a global level (e.g. wrapped into a websocket).
To sum up, during the comparison process five different protocols were
compared using a special framework. As a result O-MI / O-DF standards
seemed to be the most suitable solution to provide a portable and interoperable
communication infrastructure for a huge number of actors from device to the
systems of devices. Using O-MI and O-DF they can interact easily and thus
the problem of using different standards can be solved. These standards are
described in a more detail in a section 3.
Chapter 3
O-MI and O-DF
3.1 Introduction
The Open Group is a global consortium that consists of more than 500
members and aims to develop new IT standards that can help individuals and
companies to achieve their business goals. The Open Group IoT work group
has a pretty clear and ambitious vision: Whereas the Web uses the HTTP
protocol for transmitting HTML-formatted information which are rendered in
the browser for human consumption, the IoT will use O-MI for transmitting
O-DF payloads which will be mainly consumed by information systems [46].
In other words, these standards will enable different manufacturers, individuals
and enterprises to connect different kinds of “things” to the Internet and inte-
grate them into their enterprise network and systems on the fly, as it would be
if they were developed by the only one vendor. Many manufactures are already
gathering information about their products throughout its lifecycle, usually to
improve some internal or service processes such as maintenance and get higher
level of safety or reliability at lower costs. It can be also used to track the
manufacturing process e.g. state and health of the machines, measure energy
consumption etc. The collected data can be used for analytics and help to
improve manufacturing process, optimize costs and increase product quality.
This chapter provides detailed description of both O-MI and O-DF standards,
together with real-world examples on how they been used.
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3.1.1 O-DF
The Open Data Format is defined as a standard for representing the pay-
load in IoT application. O-DF is specified as an extensible XML Schema. It
is structured as a hierarchy with an “Objects” element as its top element. The
“Objects” element can contain any number of “Object” sub-elements. It is
intentionally defined in a similar way as data structures in object-oriented pro-
gramming [47]. O-DF addresses the problem of publishing information from
various data sources. In IoT these data sources (such as devices, machines,
server-based systems etc.) must be able to publish their data, provide the ac-
cess to consumers, use secure mechanisms to ensure authenticity and integrity
of the data and also provide the possibility to filter the information according
to the consumer’s needs: requester’s identity, context, request parameters etc.
[47]. O-DF makes it easy for information providers to publish the data using
ordinary URL (Uniform Resource Locator) address. Moreover, O-DF provides
a way for various number of systems to create, manage and exchange the infor-
mation about “things” in a standardized, understandable and universal way.
Figure 3.1: O-DF element hierarchy
Possible structure of O-DF tree
is shown on the figure 3.1. The
tree always starts with “Objects” el-
ement as the root node. “Objects”
element contains arbitrary number of
“Object” sub-elements. Each “Ob-
ject” is supposed to have at least
one “id” sub-element as an identi-
fier and optional “description” sub-
element. Moreover, each “Object”
may have properties that are declared by “InfoItem” sub-element. “InfoItem”
element in its turn can have “MetaData” sub-objects and values that are the
values from the context of “InfoItem” (i.e. temperature sensor values). “Meta-
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Data” has the same structure as “InfoItem”, but its semantic is different - it
contains the description of “InfoItem” object. It can be useful in case the sys-
tem tries to retrieve unknown “InfoItem”. “Object” elements can also have
sub-objects of the same “Object” type as itself. So the result is usually a tree
that contains arbitrary number of levels with different objects from predefined
set of types [47]. The example of a particular XML structure is shown on the
figure 3.2.
Because O-DF format has a hierarchical nature by default, it’s possible to
query for particular elements using a technique called URL mapping. Using
this technique, the client requesting information using special URL, including
object’s id or property name. For example the XML structure that is shown
above can be accessed using "wget <URL>/REST/Objects" query. If the
client wants to access only SmartHouse data or just get (or set) current humid-
ity level in the kitchen it can be done using following commands:
wget <URL>/REST/Objects/SmartHouse
wget <URL>/REST/Objects/SmartHouse/Kitchen/Humidity
To sum up, O-DF was developed to provide a way to represent information
entities about various objects - humans, services, devices etc. in a general way,
independently from application or context. The transportation mechanism is
not a part of O-DF standard. O-DF encoded information can be transmitted
through the network by various low-level protocols or even copied to and from
USB storage drive manually. However, the main purpose of O-DF was to use it
with messaging interfaces like O-MI as a query and response format [47]. The
description of O-MI is provided below.
3.1.2 O-MI
The Open Messaging Interface was created with the same purpose that
HTTP was for the Internet. Using O-MI different devices and sensors can in-
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<omi:omiEnvelope ttl="1.0" version="1.0"
xmlns="odf.xsd"
xmlns:omi="omi.xsd"
xmlns:xs="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance">
<omi:response >
<omi:result msgformat="odf">
<omi:return returnCode="200"></omi:return >
<omi:msg >
<Objects >
<Object >
<id>SmartHouse </id>
<Object >
<id>Kitchen </id>
<InfoItem name="Humidity">
<value unixTime="1459348542"
dateTime="2016 -03 -30 T17:35:42 .413+03 :00"
type="xs:double">
0.5663739287794303
</value>
</InfoItem >
</Object >
<Object >
<id>WorkHouse </id>
<InfoItem name="FrontDoor">
<value unixTime="1460970721"
dateTime="2016 -04 -18 T12:12:01 .063+03 :00"
type="xs:double">
30.967197215931222
</value>
</InfoItem >
</Object >
</Object >
</Objects >
</omi:msg >
</omi:result >
</omi:response >
</omi:omiEnvelope >
Figure 3.2: Infoitem with multiple values
teract with each other. Since in IoT the “thing” can be almost anything O-MI
was designed to be as general as possible. For product lifecycle applications
O-MI is supposed to provide a way for communication between products and
distributed information systems that consume and publish information on a
real-time basis. Despite the context or specific use case, it should be possible
to apply O-MI to the “lifecycles of anything” i.e. humans, services, projects,
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etc. [48]. O-MI can be used as a transportation mechanism for any payload, ex-
changing information between different O-MI Nodes across the network. The
information can be encoded using most of the widely used formats such as
XML, JSON and CSV. Since O-MI Nodes do not have predefined roles, the
interaction is performed on “peer-to-peer” basis where every node can act both
as a “server” and as a “client” with the other O-MI nodes or with other sys-
tems [48]. The key functional requirements reported below are based on the
needs of real-life closed-loop lifecycle [49, 50, 51] management applications. As
no existing standards could be identified that would fulfill those requirements
without extensive modification or extensions, they original designer decided to
standardize them to provide a more general solution for large-scale scalable IoT
systems.
O-MI key functional requirements
1. “Low-level” transportation ability. O-MI must be able to utilize the
usage of “low-level” protocols to transmit its messages. Protocols don’t
mean only network access protocols. Besides HTTP, SOAP, SMTP it
must be possible to transmit messages by just copying them to and from
USB stick or other storage media or just texting them using a mobile
phone.
2. Three main operations - read, write and cancel. Read operation
is used for immediate or deferred retrieval (also known as subscription).
Write operation writes the data from “Things” into the system. Cancel
operation is used to cancel subscriptions.
Immediate Read: O-MI Nodes can ask about particular values of par-
ticular moment in time or just inquire for the latest ones and they have
to get this information immediately.
Deferred Read (Subscription): Is a type of read request with speci-
fied interval rate and (optional) callback URL. After subscription request
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is made, the requester will start receiving data according to the specified
intervals. The data is sent to the callback URL. If no callback URL spec-
ified, the data can be “polled” by read request by specifying subscription
ID (given in the response of the subscription request). Polling can be
useful when using firewalls or NATs that do not allow response to reach
the callback URL.
3. Write operation availability: O-MI Nodes might need to send any
kind of information that became available to the other nodes and they
have to be able to do it at anytime.
4. Different payload formats: Even though O-DF (XML) is the preferred
payload, it must be allowed to use any text-based encoding format that
can be embedded into XML message as a payload.
5. Request and responses have to have TTL. Time-to-Live parameter
specifies the time for which the request is being valid to transmit, forward
or reply. If it expires, the request has to be removed and error message
returned.
6. Synchronous communication between nodes. In response it must
be possible to specify the request without sending additional query. There
must be also a possibility for clients to initiate the connection/communi-
cation to the nodes that are behind the firewall/NAT.
7. Data sources, services and metadata discovery and publication.
Data providers must be able to publish their data using write operation.
It must be also possible discover such data using simple HTTP queries
(URL mapping can be used) or even search engines.
8. List of target O-MI Nodes in request. It must be possible to specify
particular O-MI Nodes that have to receive, process and answer the re-
quest. Requesting nodes then are responsible for forwarding the request
to the target nodes and error handling.
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To sum up, O-MI is general mechanism of delivering messages between
nodes. It can be used for different kinds of information like physical products,
documents, repositories etc. The variety of operations is not limited to simple
read/write, but also allows subscription with data delivery on demand, on
change or on specified interval basis. The subscription concept is one of the
core concepts of O-MI.
Chapter 4
Reference Implementation
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, standard and technology adoption has often been motivated
by the available resources, both in terms of documentation and reference im-
plementation. It is imperative to associate standards with an implementation
and a “sandbox environment” in which developers can understand and learn
the standards specifications.
The reference implementation acts as some sort of executable documenta-
tion, with request and response examples covering essentially every aspect of
the standards. In this way developers can jump straight into action in under-
standing what the protocols supposed to do in reality and not only on paper.
The current reference implementation, developed at Aalto University – School
of Science – Department of Computer Science, consists of several modules:
O-MI Node Server. The server implements all O-MI basic operations.
It maintains a database where the information about O-DF data model, con-
sisting of Object(s) and InfoItem, is stored. Currently the only underlying
transport protocol supported is HTTP, but in the future there is a plan to sup-
port websockets as well. Therefore any O-MI operation is transported using
an HTTP POST. In many regards the reference implementation behave like
a normal REST endpoint, except for the subscription mechanism that allows
interval or event based responses to a list of subscribers. Moreover, subscribers
can specify a callback address (basically a URL different from one that has
sent the original request) that will receive the messages during an active sub-
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scription session. Without the callback URL the data can be polled using read
request with subscription ID. The current implementation also supports the
“cancel” to stop and delete active subscriptions.
Webclient. This module provides a graphical interface for users and devel-
opers. The main purpose is to demonstrate is automate the creation of correct
O-MI/O-DF messages, just by clicking instead of writing XML and HTTP
queries by hand.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of O-MI Node Webclient UI.
The User Interface depicted on Figure 4.1 (full resolution image can be
found in Appendix A) has been designed to guide the user like a numbered step-
by-step tutorial. The main interaction happens of left panel, with numbered
subsections. In the first one, by clicking on the ReadAll button, the webclient
forwards to the server a request to retrieve all objects. An example of an O-DF
tree is depicted on Figure 4.2.
The objects can have an arbitrary number of sub-objects or InfoItems (e.g.
BackDoor is an “InfoItem”, BedRoom is a sub-object). Users can choose the
item(s) they are interested in by just clicking on them.
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Figure 4.2: O-DF Structure.
When the user toggle a flag on a spe-
cific item, the webclient takes care
to translate it into the corresponding
XML request, including all the neces-
sary parameters according to the se-
lected type of the query. The type can
be chosen on the next panel called O-
MI Request (see Figure 4.1). When
the type is chosen the user can fill
the required and optional parameters
in the special fields. The number of
available inputs depends on the type
of the query was chosen earlier. The
fully expanded UI for parameters is shown on Figure 4.3. The TTL parameter
specified the time for which a request remains valid (time for processing and
reply). The Interval, requestID and callback URL parameters are used only for
subscription. It is also possible to specify the “n” newest or oldest values or
specify particular timeframe from which the values will be queried. All these
user selections are automatically translated by the webclient on the correspond-
ing XML, which is available for inspection of the right panel of the UI. The raw
XML is also user editable; in this way developers/advanced user can further
understand how the protocol behave and what a correct O-MI/O-DF request
looks like.
It is possible to submit the generated request to the server simply by clicking
on the Send button. The reply from the server is also available for inspection,
but of course in this case is not user editable.
Agents. The agent subsystem provides a mechanism to interact program-
matically with the core of an O-MI node. In general an agent is a sepa-
rate worker thread that fetches data from specific data sources using specific
protocols and transform them into objects that are understandable by the
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core. In general agents are used as an intermediary between the lower level
hardware (sensors/actuators/any IoT device) and the O-MI node. For exam-
ple, an agent can be a driver for a Z-wave or Plug-wise plug on/off switch.
Figure 4.3: Additional request parame-
ters.
The current implementation de-
fines two types of agents: internal and
external. Internal agents are imple-
mented as Scala Actors [52]. They
run on the same Java Virtual Ma-
chine as the O-MI Node Server and
they are dynamically loaded at run-
time. While external agents run as
independent processes from the O-MI
Node, and they can be located either
on the same machine or different ma-
chine. The interaction between exter-
nal agents and the O-MI node use a
plain TCP socket for the communica-
tion. One advantage of using exter-
nal agents is that they can be imple-
mented in any language that supports
a TCP/IP library. The security re-
quirements that the different type of
agents must implement are described in detail in chapter 5.
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4.2 Security model for the reference implemen-
tation
The current O-MI Reference Implementation does not include any security
mechanism. There used to be a very primitive IP whitelist from which it was
possible to perform the O-MI write operation while reading was allowed to
anyone. This can be hardly called a security and access control model, as it
is not possible to specify any roles and associated policies for the users and
groups. Configuring “.htaccess” file on a (Apache) web server running the
node, solve this issue only partially. One of the problems with this type of
authentication is that it is solely based on passwords that are stored on the
server (.htpasswd files in Apache) and essentially is useful to define directory
access policies. Mapping directory policies with O-DF objects (in our case –
Objects and InfoItems from O-DF Tree) is theoretically possible but is more like
a patch then a proper solution. Besides being web-server dependent, another
drawback of this solution is the fact that is impossible to distinguish between
different types of O-MI requests (read/write/delete).
Therefore it has been decided that a dedicated security module has to be
developed from scratch to enforce access management policies based on the
O-MI verbs and the O-DF data model. The next chapter will provide an in-
depth description of the requirements and the development process of the access
control and authentication modules developed during this thesis work.
Chapter 5
Security module
5.1 Introduction
For any real usage of the O-MI node reference implementation authenti-
cation and access control are fundamental. O-MI node administrators must
be able to specify the roles and the permissions for the every O-MI operation
and O-DF Object(s) and InfoItem(s). This chapter first introduces a discus-
sion regarding security requirements of different use cases in different network
configurations. After that it describes in detail the design and implementation
process of the authentication and access control module.
5.2 Different levels of security requirements for
O-MI Nodes
In IoT, confidentiality of the information and users’ privacy depend on a
variety of aspects, such as system configurations, usage scenarios, etc. As
suggested in [53], the following paragraphs will classify security requirements
according to two main perspectives: 1) network configuration perspective, 2)
use case examples.
5.2.1 Security requirements based on network configu-
ration
There are mainly four different scenarios that depend on network config-
uration or more precisely on the location (in term on belonging to the same
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or different network) of agents and clients communicating with a given O-MI
node.
• Local machine. The agent and/or the client are located on the same
machine with the server. In this case they can be considered trusted-
software, as an administrator allowed their installation on the server,
therefore and advanced security mechanisms such as query encryption or
server-client certificates can become an unnecessary processing burden.
In this scenario the security mainly concern the protection of the server
from the external treats.
• Same subnet, different machines. In this scenario agents and/or
clients are located in the same subnet as the O-MI node server, but
on the different machine. Because they are on the same subnet, the
server can interact with the other party directly using its internal IP
address without a need of going through gateways and other intermediate
nodes. In this case the network is like a closed community, with higher
level of trust compared to any other node on the Internet. However this
does not exclude potential attacks (e.g. a Node in the network has been
compromise and start to send confidential data to 3rd parties). Therefore,
in this scenario the main security threats will come from the external
attacks or if an attacker has physical access to a node in the network.
• Same network, different subnet. Typical example of such network
structure is a University, where different departments have different sub-
nets, but they are all still connected to one main University network, get-
ting access to shared resources by forwarding queries through gateways
and other internal proxy nodes. Again, if the network is isolated from the
Internet, then the security requirements from previous paragraph are ap-
plied. But in addition to that, the nodes of one subnet don’t know much
about the nodes from the other subnet, they usually interact through
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some gateway that might implement certain security restrictions. Poten-
tial attackers could override some of these policies, sniffing and spoofing
data transferred between nodes of different subnets. In this scenario the
authentication and encryption of traffic might be necessary if any of nodes
of the set of subnet cannot be fully trusted.
• Different network (Internet). In this scenario no node can be trusted
and the maximum level of security must be implemented. Anyone can be
seen as a potential attacker, therefore any agent/client must be authen-
ticated by the server and the communication must be encrypted.
5.2.2 Security requirements based on product use cases
Besides the network configuration the security requirements often depend on
the specific situation or use case. This perspective mostly involves user’s view
on the situation and consists of his/her personal requirements and concerns.
There are several levels of security, outlined here according to the [53]
• No security requirements. There are several scenarios where querying
and updating of the information does not require any security require-
ments. For example a smart fridge might provide information about the
expiration date of different foods it contains. At first sight, this might
seems as not-so-sensitive information, of course a user might be not want
that other people knows what he is eating but it does not have any se-
curity implication. However, being IoT bonded with real life objects, it
is possible to infer that maybe there are no item in fridge, because the
house is empty, which is clearly a sensitive information. In general lower
security measures increase the usability and potential of any IT system,
however in IoT understating if an information is truly sensitive or not
might be not so straightforward. Therefore in IoT no-security require-
ments is a scenario that can rarely applied.
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• Data encryption and integrity check is necessary. Encryption is
necessary, whenever an attacker can gain access to the data exchanged
over a given communication channel. Encryption includes integrity check
(but not vice versa), so the information cannot be read by a man-in-
the-middle and also cannot be tampered without notice. In the World
Wide Web, data encryption and integrity check are widely supported via
HTTPS. This protocol is recommended and supported by pretty much
all the major web-browsers or other user agents. Companies exposing
their services though a given server under a given domain simply need to
purchase a signed security certificate and maintain it up to date.
• Authentication of all interacting parties is necessary. If HTTPS
is used for encryption and integrity check and if the server has a valid
signed certificate, then client is aware of server’s true identity. In this
scenario only one of two parties is actually authenticated, however many
scenarios require that both parties are authenticated. In the Internet
this is usually accomplished using password that the client has to enter
to demonstrate its identity over an encrypted channel. Another option
is to use client side certificates as authentication mechanism: HTTPS
supports this feature out of the box and in general it is safer than easy-
to-guess password. However, one of the drawbacks of this solution is that
it increases the complexity of the security mechanism, requiring special
web-server configuration changes that for some enterprises might be com-
plicated to impose. In addition, even though it is much easier to guess a
password than a certificate, the distribution of such certificates and their
protection on the client is at risk. Last but not least is usability, most
users might not be familiar with client side certificates and when their
browser pops up the information box regarding accepting this kind of
authentication method they might simply decline or ignore it.
To sum up, this level of security is more demanding than the previous one
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encompassing the authentication of all participants in the communication
over an encrypted channel.
• User-based access control is necessary. After the user is authenti-
cated using one of the methods described above, it is often necessary to
assign them specific right over specific data objects. Similarly to what
happens in any modern operating system, where a user is allowed to per-
form only a given set of operations of given files or directories, the same
mechanism can be implemented for the resources of a network endpoint.
The last level of security described above is lacking in the current O-MI
reference implementation. Therefore, it has been decided that a flexible mod-
ule to manage users/groups and their access levels has to be designed and
implemented. The following section states the requirements for such module.
5.3 Modules requirements
One of the main requirements for the security module was to impact as little
as possible the current core implementation while providing the desired func-
tionalities. Therefore it has been decided to create a separate self-contained
module which can plugged into the existing implementation. Beside this archi-
tectural choice, there is a list of requirements to fulfill:
• Prevent unauthorized access to the resources. Only users who have
required access can perform given operation over certain data objects.
• Group based rules. All users must belong to a group. Access rules are
set for groups, never for single users. Every user can be a member of one
or many groups.
• Differentiate permissions according to the O-MI verbs. Essen-
tially this requirement can be translated into the well-known distinction
between simple read and read-write permissions.
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• Minimize server-side account maintenance. Users must be able
to register and login to the service minimizing the maintenance of such
account on the server. For this reason, OAuth2 (Facebook login in par-
ticular) authentication model was chosen.
• Recursive permissions mechanism. Permissions can be inherited
from parent object (same as in modern file systems) as well as overridden
for particular children.
• Customizable default permissions. There should be a way to set the
set of rules that apply for every user by default.
• Universal authentication mechanism. Target user is not necessarily
a human (e.g. Things/Machine). The authentication mechanism has to
be able to treat all users of the system in a universal way and should
work in the same way if the user is human being using web-browser or a
device.
• Rules management interface. The system administrator must be able
to control access policies through a centralized interface. The interface
must implement the following features:
– View the whole list of groups on the O-MI Node
– View the list of users for every group
– View the Access Control Tree for every group
– Modify the Access Control Tree for every group
– Modify group information such as name and list of members
– Add groups
– Delete groups
– Register new users
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It is quite clear how that requirements are pretty common in every security
mechanism. Therefore, it has been decided to mimic as much as possible well-
known security models such as the one implemented by the Unix File System.
Its simplicity and effectiveness remains to be matched.
5.4 General design decisions
Based on the above listed set of requirements, it has been possible to select
certain technologies, design an overall architecture and define the features that
needed to be implemented. The main design decisions are summarized in the
following list:
• Two main submodules. The security module consists of two main
parts: Registration/Authentication submodule and the Access Control
submodule. The first one is responsible for handling the registration of
new users and their information. It will also manage the authentication
process and session handling. The latter module consists of two essential
parts: administrator console and access control middleware. The first one
is a tool for system administrators to manage user groups and policies.
The second one processes and authorizes requests made by users.
• Separate Database. To satisfy the requirement of changing as little as
possible the existing core implementation, it has been decided to manage
users/groups and the related policies in a separate database. Obviously
this choice has negative effect in terms of memory and overall perfor-
mance, but it ensures code modularity and drastically simplifies code
management.
• Servlet based. The module has been written using Java using Servlet
technology, this choice is mostly due to the existing knowledge and fa-
miliarly with this particular framework.
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• Facebook as OAuth2 service provider. The feature for registra-
tion/authentication module that will support the login to the service
using Facebook credentials.
• Certificates Extension. Since the "Things” does not have dedicated
Facebook profile, these devices use client side certificates containing the
necessary credentials verifiable by the server.
Database Schema At the core of the security module there is database,
which is used to store and manage users, groups and the associated access
policies. The Entity-Relationship diagram depicting the schema of the security
module database is illustrated in figure 5.1. (Full resolution can be found in
Appendix B).
Figure 5.1: Entity-Relationship diagram of the security module database
schema.
The database contains 3 main tables: user, group and rule. When regis-
tering new users, the module obtains username and email only. Users belong
to a "default group” after their registration. The default behavior and access
policy for the "default group” can be customized by the O-MI node adminis-
trator. The group table contains the list of groups. Users and groups have
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many-to-many relationship that is implemented using a helper table named
USER_GROUP_RELATION. Access rules are stored in the rule table, is ar-
guably the most interesting for the implementation of the security module, as
it maintains the association between a group, a data object (hid), and which
kind of operation is allowed to perform (Read/ReadWrite). The meaning of the
hid in the rule table, might be not self-evident to the casual reader, therefore
it deserves an explanation.
The hierarchy_id is a specific path in the O-DF XML. Figure 5.2 provides
an example of it: InfoItem with name equals to "Temperature”, has hierarchy_-
id equals to "Objects/Kitchen/Temperature”. Basically it’s a path from the
Root element (Objects) to the current element including all intermediate parent
nodes.
<Objects >
<Object >
<id>Kitchen </id>
<InfoItem name="Temperature">
<value>5</value>
</InfoItem >
</Object >
</Objects >
Figure 5.2: XML example for hierarchy ID
The Group id column of the rule table is related to the id property in
GROUP table. The Write_Permissions column is a Boolean flag (0=R (read)
or 1=RW (read+write)). Finally the Object_Rule column indicates if the rule
is applied to an Object or an InfoItem. The InfoItem is a type of node that
contains data (e.g. Temperature Sensor Reading), while an Object (e.g. Tem-
perature Sensor), from a security perspective is similar to a folder in file system,
it might contains other objects and/or InfoItems. The rules for a given Object
must also apply recursively to the Objects and InfoItems it contains. Like in a
normal file system, an Administrator can also break rule inheritance and man-
ually override the rules for a particular node. Finally the Administrator table
is a helper table that maintains a list of user with admin rights and it is filled
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manually by the server administrators.
5.5 Interaction principles
Given the decision of developing the security module as a separate plug-
in for the O-MI reference implementation, the interaction between these two
software has to be planned: Two main interaction types were identified 1) user
registration 2) authentication and access control granting.
5.5.1 User registration or authentication scenario
When a user lands for the first time in an O-MI webclient window (or in
case his/her session has expired), the system redirects the user to perform an
authentication process. Because OAuth2 has been used for reasons explained
above, the credentials are obtained from a 3rd party website without the need
for the user to type them manually. The interaction scheme is shown in the
Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: User registration/authentication interaction map.
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In this scenario the user interacts with the access control (AC) module
through the web-browser. On the login webpage the user selects the registration
using an OAuth provider (e.g. Facebook). AC Module redirects the user to the
service provider’s webpage where he/she is asked for a permission of using his
personal data. After the user agrees, the service provider redirects him/her back
together with the access token, which is forwarded to the AC Module. After
that the module is able to get user’s personal data by making HTTP queries to
the service provider calling vendor-specific APIs (in this case Facebook). After
getting the data, the AC Module checks if the user is already registered; if
not, user’s info are stored in the database presented in the previous paragraph.
Then if no errors occur the module sets the session cookies in the user’s browser.
Finally the user is authenticated and is able to perform queries to the O-MI
Node Server and using the webclient.
5.5.2 Access control
Once a user is registered to the system, it is possible to associate this account
to particular groups restricting/granting the access to particular data objects.
For this purpose a dedicated user interface, called the access management tool,
has been developed (see Figure 5.4, additional images of UI can be found in
Appendix C). This user interface interacts with the access control module in
the backend, which essentially manages and stores access rules on the database
described above.
Access management tool: The user interface of this tool partially re-
sembles the O-MI Node, extending its functionality. This tool is supposed to
be used by the administrative staff in charge of the O-MI node. In the user
interface, administrators can manage groups and users and set special rules for
them. They can create, modify or delete groups and add or remove particular
users to given group(s). Mimicking the same user interface used in the reference
implementation webclient, it is possible to retrieve all the objects available in
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Figure 5.4: Access control module User Interface.
the O-MI Node (ReadAll operation) and set access policies for every node of
the O-DF tree. The policies are simple [no-access/read/read-write] flag, which
are associated with every node in O-DF tree. These rules are forwarded (by
pressing the "Save” button) to AC module on the backend which is in charge
of storing them in the database. When a certain group is selected from the
dropdown list (see Figure 5.4), the system automatically loads the rules for
that group from the database and shows them in the tree.
Backend: The access control backend, besides storing the configuration
set in access management tool in the database, has the fundamental function
of interacting with the O-MI node core. The interaction is extremely simple:
essentially the O-MI node asks: "Is the access to the resource X for the user
Y and request type Z allowed?”, and the module replies "Yes or No” based
on rules that have been set by the administrators. The module’s interaction
scheme is shown on the Figure 5.5.
This scenario usually starts after the authentication process is completed
and the user has a valid session cookie. After being authenticated, the user can
start to interact with the O-MI Node Server via the webclient.
When the user sends a request (e.g. read request for a particular object or
set of objects) to the O-MI a session cookie is also forwarded. The O-MI Node
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Figure 5.5: Access control interaction map.
receives and parses the request, it then invokes one of the AuthAPI methods,
(which is part of the O-MI core implementation), passing as parameters the list
of objects, described in term of hierarchy id, that user is trying to access and
the user session. The invoked method forwards the request to the AC Module,
by performing an HTTP POST to the service running in localhost. The AC
Module service selects the appropriate rules from its database, matching them
with the request permissions. If the user has appropriate access right on every
item of the hierarchy_id list, the service replies True back to Auth API. In
case 1 or more item violate access rules stored in the database, the service
replies False scrapping the entire request. Once the Auth API has received the
True/False answer from the AC service, the O-MI Node finally replies to the
user with either the requested data or an access denied error.
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5.6 Implementation
In the previous paragraph the overall design of the module has been pre-
sented, while this paragraph focuses on the technologies and implementation
details of the developed module. Despite the fact that the O-MI Node Server
is written in Scala it was decided to implement security module in Java. This
decision is mostly due to the familiarly with the language and the available
server-side framework. In addition it is worth to notice that it is possible to
execute Java code from Scala applications as they are both compiled as byte-
code for the same Java Virtual Machine. Therefore there was no real concern
if a tighter integration between the modules is required.
Figure 5.6: Module class diagram.
Since the module has been designed to be standalone, an embedded Jetty
Servlet container was used to implement the communication (http) with the
O-MI Node.
Figure 5.6 depicts the overall code organization. The blue ovals represent
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the servlets: the AuthServlet is an authentication servlet that handles user
authentication and sets up a session. The PermissionService is the core servlet
of the module. It is responsible for the majority of functions implemented by
the AC module; such as: the backend service for access management UI tool
and enforcing access control on behalf of the O-MI Node.
Additional classes include: DBHelper which is a wrapper class for managing
table structure and entities in for the SQLite database. The ConfigHelper class
contains basic configuration parameters, such as the database name and server
URL. The AuthService is an intermediary class responsible for writing object
permissions from the O-DF tree structure (using the access management UI
tool) into the database. Finally, the last component interacting with the AC
module is the AuthAPI. Essentially it is an external class, which is now included
in the O-MI Node implementation, providing an abstracted and uniform way to
perform authentication and authorization, hiding the implementation details
regarding how this functions are performed. This allows future updates to the
AC module which will be completely transparent to the O-MI Node.
5.7 SSL certificates extension
OAuth is the ideal choice when the entity interacting with the system is
a human being utilizing a web-browser. If the "user-agent" is something else
than a web-browser, such as an IoT device running its own firmware, the OAuth
sessions mechanism is not a suitable method.
One of the real-world uses in which the O-MI Node and AC Module has
been applied for testing was a smart home installation. Essentially it consists
of a number of different sensors connected together to central gateway. The
gateway connects the house with the internet and the ISP (Internet Service
Provider) assigns a dynamic IP which might change over time. The usage of
dynamic IPs is very common and that was one of the reason why the previous
authorization method based on IP whitelist was abandoned. However, in this
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scenario also OAuth won’t work because the user agent is not a browser and it
does not make sense to authorize a physical device (the home gateway) using a
Facebook account. To address this issue, it has been decided to use client SSL
certificates.
Figure 5.7: Certificates exchange diagram.
Normally, when using HTTPS protocol, the server buys a certificate from
an authorized Certificate Authority. When the client connects to the server
through HTTPS it receives the server certificate and checks within the CA
if the certificate is valid [54]. For the O-MI Node, mutual authentication is
needed, meaning the gateway need to sure that it talks to the correct server,
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and the O-MI server needs to be sure that it is talking to the right client (See
figure 5.7). In practice the O-MI Node creates a certificate and signs it (with
the server private key). Network distribution of such certificate is also possible,
if a trusted software is already running on the target machine, otherwise the
certificate has to be physically installed in the device. At this point when the
home gateway establishes a normal HTTPS connection with the O-MI Node, it
sends its certificate to the O-MI Node. The O-MI node is able to verify (using
its public key) that the received certificate has been signed by the server itself,
and it can finally authenticate the device.
Obviously, the identity of the device and its access rights must be also con-
figured beforehand using the AC management UI tool. In this case an invented
e-mail address has been used as "user-id", which is stored upon registration in
AC module database. This e-mail address is one metadata of the client cer-
tificate, which is extracted by the O-MI Node and forwarded as "user-id" to
the AC module that can finally check if the requests the device is performing
comply with policies stored in the AC database. It is worth to notice that a
real manufacturer could use the product serial number, instead of an email,
as "device/user-id", or even better a globally unique identifier, such as the
ID@URI concept proposed by [55]. Ideally, the URI is the internet domain of
the manufacturer (e.g. samsung.com) whose uniqueness is guaranteed by the
DNS [Oat Systems & MIT Auto-ID Center, 2002], while the ID part can be
only locally (inside the address space of the URI) unique identifier such as a
product serial number or it a Global Trade Identification Number (GTIN).
As final note, it is worth to notice that the same authentication mechanism
could be used also for human being; however even if the major web-browsers
currently support client side certificate, the casual user is usually not aware of
this authentication scheme and (at least for the moment) might confuse him/her
which ultimately lead to leaving the website. Considering the fact that the main
purpose of the O-MI reference implementation is to promote and divulgate
the standards; it is paramount to attract as many users as possible, that’s
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supporting well know authentication method like OAuth is still necessary.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of findings
The main focus of this research was to develop a suitable security model for
the Open Messaging Interface (O-MI) and Open Data Format (O-DF) stan-
dards. In the first part of the thesis a general introduction to IoT was provided,
highlighting its disruptive potential and the importance of overcoming current
vertical information silos to realize a truly unified IoT. A set of requirements for
achieving this IoT grand vision was discussed. Subsequently, several existing
messaging standards were presented and compared with O-MI and O-DF. This
comparative analysis highlighted how current standards address only partially
the requirements necessary for achieving a unified IoT and identify O-MI and
O-DF as one potential enabler for this goal.
The second part of the thesis describes in detail the core concepts behind
O-MI and O-DF, together with their application in real-world usage scenar-
ios. The set of characteristics that sets O-MI apart from existing standards
(transport protocol independency, subscription, support of different payload
formats) were also highlighted. After that, the description of the current O-MI
reference implementation, and how it can be integrated into any arbitrary data
provider/consumer application scenario, has been presented. Its main compo-
nents, such as the O-MI Node Server, the webclient and agents system were
also described and usage examples were provided. Next, the support for ac-
cess control and authentication for the reference implementation was discussed.
Since the existing mechanisms were limited to IP-whitelisting for given O-MI
operation, it was decided to develop an external security plug-in module that
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could provide authentication and access control to the existing O-MI reference
implementation.
The third and final part of the thesis describes the design and implemen-
tation choices of the module that was developed. First, the requirements and
possible scenarios were presented. Three main functionalities needed to be ad-
dressed: authentication, access control and administration management. Based
on the stated requirements, core design decisions were discussed, such as a plat-
form/language selection, code architecture etc. Finally, the integration with
the existing O-MI reference implementation was presented using a smart-home
scenario as testbed.
6.2 Implications of the research
The thesis had two main objectives. The first one was to present O-MI and
O-DF standards and show that they can help to enable seamless communication
between heterogeneous devices in IoT, acting as aggregator nodes and ensuring
interoperability at a system-to-system level. The second one was to develop an
access control mechanism that could be plugged-in into the existing reference
implementation. It was demonstrated how it is possible to set the rules for
different data elements and semantic entities and apply the rules to the real
IoT system in a general manner. Legal and privacy issues, related with the IoT
data exchange, were not covered by this thesis.
6.3 Reliability and validity of the research
The security module developed can be only partially reused as such for
the integration with others systems than the O-MI reference implementation.
However, the requirements, the core design decisions and the code structure
has been conceived to be generally applicable to other systems, providing a
solid foundation for a further abstraction and generality of the used approach.
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6.4 Future work
This research leads to the conclusion that the O-MI and O-DF standards
represent a step towards a unified vision for the IoT, providing better integra-
tion capability compared to existing protocols, systems or standards.
However, there are still some areas that need to be addressed. In the in-
troduction it was argued how security is already one of major IoT concerns,
for users, developers and other stakeholders. The O-MI and O-DF standards
deliberately do not include any particular security model. However, it would be
extremely useful to advice third parties, who might want to develop their own
implementation of the standards, the recommended authentication and autho-
rization model. The authentication model presented in this thesis is based on
client side SSL certificates and it is truly applicable to pretty much any sce-
nario. Certificates are a far superior authentication method than traditional
device ID and password, however their safe distribution over the internet might
pose additional challenges. However, it is worth noticing that if this authen-
tication method will become the dominant one, a device manufacturer could
embed the certificate directly into their product even before the device is sold
to the public. Hardware manufacturers could also develop methods for making
it impossible to alter or steal these certificates, even with physical access to the
device. On the downside one common problem with certificates is that they
have an expiration date, updating certificates manually on potentially millions
of device is definitely not an option. Of course an alternative is to make the
client register itself by generating a private and public key pair. The public key
is sent to the server as a part of certificate request. This request also contains
additional information about the target user such as email, organization name
and so on. The server then builds the certificate, signs it with the client’s pub-
lic key and sends back to the client that decrypts it. The connection between
the server and the client is secure and using encryption mechanism (such as
HTTPS). Clearly this would work if and only if the server can be sure that it
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is talking with the right client.
Currently there are plenty of options on how IoT authentication and au-
thorization can be implemented. A single master thesis can barely scratch the
surface of this vast topic, however this research has highlighted the importance
of the convergence to one unified IoT technology stack. In conclusion this thesis
reject the argument that security must be use case dependent, and advocates
for a set of well-known shared technologies that every IoT installation should
comply to.
Appendix A
O-MI Webclient
This shows the user interface that was developed for O-MI Reference Im-
plementation and already existed by the time when this thesis started. Main
windows and parameters and the overall interface composition are presented.
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Figure A.1: O-MI Webclient User Interface
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Figure A.2: O-MI Webclient User Interface
Appendix B
Security module database
This shows the scheme of database that was designed for the security module
in Chapter 5.
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Figure B.1: Illustration of access control and authentication modules db
Appendix C
Security module admin panel
This appendix shows the interface for Administrators of the security module
that was developed in this thesis. Main windows and parameters and the overall
interface composition are presented.
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Figure C.1: Security module admin panel User Interface
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Figure C.2: Create new user window
Figure C.3: Set permissions window
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